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The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur."
-Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution1
The "advice and consent of the Senate" are ... coextensive with
the "power" conferred on the President, which is "to make trea-
ties," and apply to the entire process of treatymaking.
-Henry Cabot Lodge
2
The President ... may guide every step of diplomacy, and to guide
diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if the faith
and prestige of the government are to be maintained. He need
disclose no step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in
any critical matter it is completed the government is virtually




In Wilson v. Girard,4 the Supreme Court stated that a "Security
Treaty between Japan and the United States, signed September 8, 1951,
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3. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77-78
(1905).
4. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
Michigan Journal of International Law
was ratified by the Senate on March 20, 1952 and proclaimed by the
President effective on April 28, 1952."' This sentence seems to be a
pedestrian comment on the Senate's role in the treaty-making pro-
cess-except for one small detail. The Treaty Clause of the United
States Constitution does not give the Senate the power merely to "rati-
fy" treaties. Rather, the Constitution requires that treaties receive the
"Advice and Consent of the Senate."6
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's use of the word "ratified" is an
accurate description of the Senate's present role in treatymaking. Gen-
erally, the President negotiates a treaty without receiving any formal
"advice" from the Senate. Only after completing a negotiation does the
President submit a treaty to the Senate for its approval. 7 "Advice and
consent" has come to mean "ratification." But is "advice and consent"
really a constitutional synonym for "ratification?" Or, does the Treaty
Clause empower, or perhaps even require, the Senate to play a more
active part in the negotiation of treaties?
This article analyzes the role that the Constitution assigns to the
Senate in treatymaking and the implications of this role on the relation-
ship between the President and the Senate. Part I examines the meaning
of "advice and consent" in the Treaty Clause. It discusses the origins of
the phrase "advice and consent," the history of the drafting of the Treaty
Clause, and the implications of the Framers' decision to include the
Treaty Clause in Article II of the Constitution.
Drawing on these sources, Part I considers three possible interpreta-
tions of the Treaty Clause. The first interpretation, which has been
forcefully advanced by Professor Arthur Bestor, and which I refer to as
the Senatorial Dominance Model, would give the Senate the power of
"deciding upon the policy to be pursued in a treaty negotiation and of
formally approving the diplomatic instructions embodying this policy." 8
The second approach, which I term the Ratification Model, gives the
5. Id at 526 (footnote omitted).
6. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
7. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 104
(Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS]
("[W]hat Presidents generally seek from Senators is not advice in advance, but consent after
the fact-after negotiations are completed. Most treaties, therefore, engage the Senate only
after their formal transmission by the President for approval."). See also LouIs HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130-32 (1972); PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H.
BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 520-21 (1988).
8. Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abroga-
tion of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Exam-
ined, 55 WASH. L. REv. 1, 112 (1979).
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Senate no role other than the power to vote to approve or reject a treaty
which the President has already negotiated. Finally, the Recommenda-
tion Model provides the Senate with the constitutional power to suggest
diplomatic instructions or broad negotiating goals to the President, while
allowing the President the option of ignoring the Senate's suggestions.
Part I concludes that the Recommendation Model is the correct interpre-
tation of the Treaty Clause.
Part II explores the implications of the Recommendation Model on
the relationship between the Executive and the Senate. It discusses an
immense practical problem that the Senate would face if it wished to
exercise its Treaty Clause power to offer nonbinding advice to the
Executive. Unlike the Executive, the Senate does not control a huge
foreign-policy apparatus that can supply it with diplomatic information.
In order to exercise its advice power, the Senate must, therefore, depend
on the Executive for this information. Part II considers whether the
President can refuse to provide the Senate with information relevant to
treatymaking. It discusses the doctrine of executive privilege and con-
cludes that the Recommendation Model sharply restricts the President's
constitutional authority to refuse to give the Senate access to informa-
tion that it would need in order to perform its advice function.
PART I: INTERPRETING "ADVICE AND CONSENT":
WHAT TREATY-MAKING ROLE DOES THE
CONSTITUTION ASSIGN TO THE SENATE?
A. "Advice and Consent" as an Eighteenth
Century Term of Art
Treaty Clause interpreters might be tempted simply to look up the
words "advice" and "consent" in a dictionary and combine their defini-
tions. Professor Glenn Harlan Reynolds employed this method to inter-
pret the meaning of "advice and consent" in the Appointments Clause.9
The meaning of "consent" is pretty obvious. So what does "ad-
vice" mean? Well, advice is normally conceived of as something
not binding-we may give advice freely, but it is a gift that the
recipient is not obliged to take. This is what makes advice different
from, say, a command.... Thus, the text provides that the Senate
9. The Appointments Clause provides that the President "shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint." U.S. CoNsT. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
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may advise the President on who should be nominated, but the
President should be held under no constitutional duty to follow that
advice-though there is perhaps a duty to listen to the advice
before nominating anyone.'0
But Reynold's approach fails to account for the fact that "advice and
consent" was a term of art that appeared in Eighteenth Century English
statutes and in many of the constitutions of the original thirteen Ameri-
can states. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, "advice and
consent" had a meaning quite different from what Professor Reynolds
has suggested.
Beginning in the Seventeenth Century, English statutes contained the
following enacting clause: "[B]e it enacted by the King's most Excel-
lent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual
and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and
by the Authority of the same.... 2 The "advice and consent" that
Parliament gave the Monarch in the legislative process was no mere
"advice," as that word is used today. By the time of the framing of the
American Constitution, Parliament dominated the legislative process.
The Monarch's role was reduced to withholding his royal assent from
parliamentary laws with which he disagreed. Even this formal power
had atrophied by the late Eighteenth Century: Queen Anne was the last
Monarch to use the royal veto, in 1707.13
10. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest Proposal for
Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577, 1579 (1992).
11. Arthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of
the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 527, 541 (1974).
12. E.g., An Act to empower his Majesty to secure and detain persons charged with, or
suspected of, the crime of high treason, committed in any of his Majesty's colonies or
plantations in America, or on the high seas, or the crime of piracy, 17 Geo. 3, ch. 9 (1777)
(Eng.). An Act against the Importation of Gunpowder, Arms, and other Ammunition, and
Utensils of War, 1 Jam. 2, c. 8 (1685), quoted in Bestor, supra note 11 at 541-42. Prior to
the late 1600s, enacting clauses contained slight variations on this phrasing. See RAOUL
BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 122 n.23 (1974) (describing "[a]n
early version, 3 Hen. V, 1 Stat. at Large 466 (1415), [which] states: 'Our Lord the King, at
his Parliament ... by the Advice and Assent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and at the
Request of the Commons ... hath ordained and established divers Statutes and Ordinanc-
es.' ").
13. See 1 WILLIAM ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 300 (5th ed.
1922). For a description of the Monarchy's legislative power in the Eighteenth Century, see 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 49-51, 156. See generally WALTER BAGEHOT, THE
ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 34-89 (Little, Brown, & Co. 1873) (1872). The last monarch to
attempt to have any significant role in shaping legislation was King George Ill. Frustrated by
the Monarchy's loss of its law-making power during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centu-
ries, George III attempted to seize back some role in the legislative process by appointing
ministers that would do his bidding in Parliament. He was successful from 1770 to 1782,
during the prime ministership of Lord North, who pushed George III's agenda through
[Vol. 18:445
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The term "advice and consent" was not confined to English statutes.
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, every written state consti-
tution created a council that advised the chief executive. 4 Six of these
state constitutions used the term "advice and consent" to describe powers
to be shared between the chief executive and the council. 5 The level of
control exercised by these councils varied considerably from state to
state.16 However, the councils shared two common characteristics. First,
the "advice" that they dispensed was not informal; most states required
that records be kept of council proceedings, that conciliar advice be given
in writing, and that the votes of the individual councilors be recorded.'
7
Second, they were part of state constitutions that "included almost every
conceivable provision for reducing the executive to a position of complete
subordination."' 8 Indeed, councils played such an active part in exercising
executive power that, in the words of Virginia Governor Edmund
Randolph, the governor was only "a member of the executive.'
9
Parliament. This reemergence of some semblance of monarchal power was short-lived,
however. Throughout the 1770's, opposition to George III and Lord North grew in Parlia-
ment. Finally, in 1782, five years before the American Constitution was drafted, Parliament
reasserted itself and forced George III to accept a Whig government which he despised. From
that point on, there have been no further attempts by British monarchs to play any significant
part in lawmaking. See GEORGE BURTON ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
401-09 (6th ed. 1935).
14. See Bestor, supra note 11, at 643-44. The names given to these councils ("Privy
Council," "Council of State," "Executive Council," and "Council") varied somewhat but their
duties were essentially similar. See id
15. See id. at 644-45. The six states were South Carolina, Delaware, Maryland, New
York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. For example, Article 35 of the South Carolina
Constitution provided that "the governor and commander-in-chief.., by and with the advice
and consent of the privy council, may lay embargoes ... for any time not exceeding thirty
days, in the recess of the general assembly." 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3255 (Francis
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) quoted in Bestor, supra note 11, at 646 n.435.
16. Charles Thach summarized the relationship between colonial governors and councils:
The first South Carolina constitution provided that the council's advice need be
asked only where the constitution expressly required it, but in the second the matter
was left entirely to legislative determination. The latter method was adopted in
Maryland, where also it was provided that the council should constitute a board "for
the transacting of business," in which the governor had only a single vote. The
Delaware constitution provided that the governor might convene the council when
he deemed it advisable, a provision made applicable in New Jersey to the whole
upper chamber, which was intended, it would seem to have special advisory
functions as a whole... Both these documents are very vague, however ....
CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 28 n.7 (1969).
17. See Bestor, supra note 11, at 646.
18. THACH, supra note 16, at 28; see generally idl at 25-54 (describing the dominance of
the legislature and lack of a unitary executive in the state governments that existed between
1776 and 1787).
19. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Nov. 24, 1786), quoted in
THACH, supra note 16, at 29. This comment is particularly revealing considering that the
Spring 1997]
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Thus, at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the term "advice
and consent" denoted a Parliament that exercised nearly plenary law-
making power and state councils that played a substantial role in the
exercise of executive power. This historical context suggests that the
Constitution assigns the Senate some active function in treatymaking and
does not limit it to the role of a ratifier.
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the Treaty Clause simply
by referring to how Parliament and American state constitutions used the
phrase "advice and consent." The form of government created by the
American Constitution was different from that of England or of American
state governments. The Treaty Clause must be interpreted as part of
Article II of the American Constitution, rather than part of an English
statute or of the constitution of Eighteenth Century South Carolina.
Unfortunately, the history of the drafting of the Treaty Clause-of how
and why the words "advice and consent" were made part of Article II of
the Constitution-is not very illuminating.
B. The Enigmatic History of the Treaty Clause-The Rise and Fall of
the Senatorial Dominance Model
Drawing partly on the Eighteenth Century definition of "advice and
consent," Arthur Bestor, the author of two comprehensive analyses of the
history of the Treaty Clause,2' argues that the Senate should have a
dominant role in treatymaking. According to Bestor:
[t]he word "advice," if given any defensible meaning, signifies with
great precision the task of deciding upon the policy to be pursued
in a treaty negotiation and of formally approving the diplomatic
instructions embodying this policy. It goes without saying that
concessions have to be made in the course of any complicated
negotiation. Instructions cannot be mandatory, except, perhaps, on
a small number of extremely critical points. "Advice" in this context
derives its force from the obligation it imposes on the executive to
explain why various departures from the instructions were necessary
in order to achieve some more fundamental aim of the agreed-upon
policy."
constitution of Virginia did not use the phrase "advice and consent," but merely required the
Governor to act "with the advice of' the Council of State. See Bestor, supra note 11, at 645
n.431.
20. Comprehensive is probably an understatement; Bestor's two principal articles total
some 273 pages. See supra notes 8 and 11.
21. Bestor, supra note 8, at 112.
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Bestor bases this Senatorial Dominance Model on the treaty-making
procedure that operated from 1781 to 1787 under the Articles of Confed-
eration. Because the Articles of Confederation did not create any execu-
tive branch, Congress exercised complete control over treatymaking. 22 To
facilitate the negotiation of treaties, Congress created the office of
Secretary of Foreign Affairs.23 However, Congress retained control over
policy decisions relevant to treatymaking, allowing the Secretary discre-
tion over only minor matters.' On more than one occasion, Congress
appointed a committee to investigate the Department of Foreign Affairs.25
This model of treatymaking, in which the legislature makes all the
policy decisions and approves diplomatic instructions, prevailed through-
out most of the Constitutional Convention. From the beginning of the
Convention on May 25, 1787, until September 4, thirteen days before the
Convention finished its work, no formal motion or committee report
suggested that the President should play any role whatsoever in
treatymaking. 6 Alexander Hamilton did offer a plan on June 18 propos-
ing that the President "have with the advice and approbation of the Senate
the power of making all treaties. ' 27 But Hamilton's plan had few support-
ers and it was not brought to a vote.28
22. Congress also had the power to authorize states to enter into treaties with foreign
countries. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION, art. VI ("No states"
without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall ... enter into any
conference, agreement, or alliance or treaty with any King, prince or state .... ).
23. See Bestor, supra note 8, at 56. Robert Livingston served as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs from 1781-83. John Jay replaced Livingston in 1784 and served for the duration of the
Articles of Confederation period. d at 56-73.
24. See id at 57. For example, in February 1782, Congress passed a resolution describing
the duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which stated:
[P]rovided always, that letters to the ministers of the United States, or ministers of
foreign powers, which have a direct reference to treaties or conventions proposed to
be entered into, or instructions relative thereto, or other great national subjects, shall
be submitted to the inspection and receive the approbation of Congress before they
shall be transmitted.
22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 88-89 (Library of Congress ed. 1906) quoted
in Bestor, supra note 8, at 57.
25. See BERGER, supra note 12, at 126.
26. See Arthur Bestor, "Advice" From the Beginning, "Consent" When the End is
Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 718, 719 (1989). This exclusion of the President from
treatymaking was consistent with the narrow view of executive power that prevailed throughout
most of the Constitutional Convention. On June 1, the Convention voted to grant the Executive
only the "power to carry into execution the national laws" and "to appoint to offices in cases
not otherwise provided for." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 63
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand]. In this June 1 debate, James Wilson, a vigorous
advocate of a strong executive, stated: "Making peace and war are generally determined by
Writers on the Laws of Nations to be legislative powers." Id at 73-74.
27. 1 Farrand, supra note 26, at 292.
28. See Bestor, supra note 11, at 590.
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The Convention's Committee on Detail submitted the first specific
draft of a treaty clause on August 6. It stated that the Senate alone would
have the power "to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and
Judges of the Supreme Court."29 Over the next two weeks, delegates
levelled two principal lines of criticism against the Committee on Detail's
draft. Delegates from large states faulted the draft for excluding the
House of Representatives.30 Some delegates also criticized the draft for
not requiring a two-thirds vote.3" With one insignificant exception, there
was not a single statement advocating a presidential role in treatymaki-
ng.32 If the Committee on Detail had stopped here, Professor Bestor
would be right. As of August 6, 1787, the Senate, like the Articles of
Confederation Congress, possessed the sole power to make treaties.
However, on August 23, the Senatorial Dominance Model began to
unravel when James Madison commented that since "the Senate repre-
sented the States alone ... for this as well as other obvious reasons it
was proper that the President should be an agent in Treaties. '33 Bestor
denies significance to Madison's statement:
Madison's choice of the word "agent" . . . indicates clearly enough
that he was not proposing a wholesale transfer of foreign-policy
making from legislative to executive hands .... Madison, in short,
was not proposing an innovation. He merely wished to write into the
new Constitution the relationship that already existed between the
old Congress and its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, substituting for
the former the about-to-be-created Senate, and for the latter the head
of the about-to-be-created executive branch, the President. Had he
been proposing something more far-reaching, some comment-some
outcry, more probably would have followed his speech. There was
29. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 183.
30. See Bestor, supra note 8, at 93-96.
31. See id at 97-100.
32. The exception was an August 15 speech by John Francis Mercer of Maryland, who
argued that "the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the
Executive department .... 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 297. However, none of Mercer's
colleagues responded to or showed any other sign of interest in Mercer's suggestion, perhaps
because a number of the delegates thought of Mercer as an opportunist. See Bestor, supra note
8, at 105 (quoting a letter from Jefferson to Madison in which Jefferson described Mercer as
"a candidate for the secretaryship of foreign affairs and tho' he will not get the vote of one
state, I beleive [sic] he expects the appointment... Vanity and ambition seem to be the ruling
passions of this young man, and as his objects are impure, so also are his means."). Bestor also
notes that "Mercer is virtually the last delegate whose opinion can be credited as evidence of
his colleague's feelings." Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking
Clause as a Case Study, 1 PERSP. IN AM. HIsr. (n.s.) 233, 240 n.12 (citing Bestor, supra note
8, at 103-06).
33. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 392.
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none whatever. Madison had made an observation, not a motion, and
the Convention immediately directed its attention elsewhere. In this
day's discussion of treatymaking, the President was mentioned by
no one but Madison.3
On August 31, without any further statements on the President's role in
treatymaking, the Convention voted to refer the issue of treatymaking to
a Committee that was created to deal with "such parts of the Constitution
as have been postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been acted
on."935 On September 4, this Committee on Postponed Parts reported to
the Convention a draft treaty clause that read: "The President by and with
the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have power to make Treaties
.... But no Treaty shall be made without the consent of two thirds of
the members present.
36
The Committee on Postponed Parts's proposed treaty clause differed
dramatically from the version submitted by the Committee on Detail on
August 6. Not only did the Senate lose its exclusive treaty-making role,
but in its September 4 draft, the Committee on Postponed Parts placed the
treaty clause in Article X of its draft constitution, the article that dealt
with executive power.37 A five-person Committee on Style then made
some cosmetic changes to the Committee on Postponed Parts's draft,
which resulted in the final version of the Treaty Clause.
Despite these substantial changes, there was very little debate on the
President's role in treatymaking.38 Bestor emphasizes this lack of debate.
He interprets the silence of the delegates as evidence that they did not
wish to change the Senatorial Dominance Model that had prevailed
during the early stages of the Constitutional Convention.39
But an examination of the statements of a number of prominent
Framers shows that there certainly was not a consensus behind the
Senatorial Dominance Model. In fact, the Framers interpreted the Treaty
Clause in varying ways; some argued that the Constitution gave the
Senate a substantial role in treatymaking while others contended that the
President would have the primary responsibility.
34. Bestor, supra note 8, at 109.
35. 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at 473.
36. Id. at 498-99.
37. See id
38. See Bestor, supra note 11, at 652-60. There was, however, considerable debate on the
exclusion of the House of Representatives and on the requirement of a two-thirds Senate vote.
See Bestor, supra note 8, at 123-31.
39. See Bestor, supra note 8, at 101 (discussing "[t]he absence of controversy on the
matter is almost conclusive proof that no radical change from previously established practices
was contemplated.").
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For example, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, William
Davie, a Framer, asserted that "it would seem that the whole power of
making treaties ought to be left to the President, who, being elected by
the people of the United States at large, will have their general interest
at heart[,J" but since the small states demanded "an absolute equality in
making treaties[,]" it had been found "indispensable to give to the
senators, as representatives of the states, the power of making, or rather
ratifying treaties." 40 Davie's interpretation of the Treaty Clause is diamet-
rically opposed to the Senatorial Dominance Model. Not only did Davie
reduce the Senate to the role of a ratifier, but he viewed the President as
the articulator of the national interest.
41
James Wilson, who has been characterized as the creator of the
American presidency,42 held similar views. In December 1787, Wilson
argued that "[t]he Senate can make no treaties; they can approve of none
unless the President lay it before them. 43 He went on that "[w]ith regard
to their power in forming treaties, [the Senate] can make none; they are
only auxiliaries to the President."44
A number of prominent figures did interpret the Treaty Clause as
giving the Senate a more significant role. In Federalist 64, John Jay, who
was then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, wrote that "[iut seldom happens in
the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and
immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. 45 Secrecy and dispatch, Jay
argued, were attributes of the President, not the Senate. But Jay then
provided a narrow definition of presidential power:
Those matters which in negotiations usually require the most secrecy
and the most dispatch are those preparatory and auxiliary measures
which are not otherwise important in a national view, than as they
tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of the negotiation. For
these the President will find no difficulty to provide; and should any
circumstance occur which requires the advice and consent of the
Senate, he may at any time convene them. Thus we see that the
Constitution provides that the negotiations for treaties shall have
every advantage which can be derived from talents, information,
40. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 120 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1937) (emphasis added).
41. Davie's view of the President was shared by Gouverneur Morris who characterized the
President as "the general Guardian of the National interests." 2 Farrand, supra note 26, at
540-41.
42. See THACH, supra note 16, at 176-77.
43. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 480
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976).
44. Id at 491.
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from
secrecy and dispatch on the other.46
Thus, Jay saw the Senate as having some role in setting the treaty-making
policy and only being excluded from "preparatory and auxiliary mea-
sures."
47
Alexander Hamilton, usually an advocate of an energetic executive,
characterized the treaty-making power as neither purely legislative nor
executive: "The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct
department, and to belong, properly, neither to the legislative nor to the
executive., 48 The qualities needed for effective management of foreign
negotiations made the President "the most fit agent in those transactions;
while the vast importance of the trust and the operation of treaties as laws
plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion of the
legislative body in the office of making them." 49 Hamilton's use of the
word "agent" suggests a limited presidential role. However, Hamilton
points out that the President is not "the ministerial servant of the Senate"
and that the President and the Senate share "joint possession" of the
treaty power.50
In sum, prominent political figures of the 1780s disagreed over the
original meaning of the Treaty Clause. This lack of consensus is not
particularly surprising considering the schizophrenic nature of the Treaty
Clause.51 On the one hand, the phrase "advice and consent" suggests
some active senatorial role beyond mere ratification. On the other hand,
the Framers placed the Treaty Clause in Article II, the constitutional
source of presidential power.
C. Treatymaking as an Article II Power
In Goldwater v. Carter,52 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the President has the constitutional power to
46. Id. at 393.
47. Id. Federalist 64 is unclear about whether the President would be free to disregard the
Senate's advice.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 452.
51. Nor is this lack of agreement unique to the Treaty Clause. As a general matter, there
was no consensus on the scope of presidential power. See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 7, at
11. See generally THACH, supra note 16, at 140-65.
52. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam). The Supreme Court vacated the
Court of Appeals's decision on the grounds that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
question, Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment),
and was not ripe, id, at 997 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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terminate a treaty unilaterally. The court noted that "[i]t is significant that
the treaty power appears in Article II of the Constitution, relating to the
executive branch, and not in Article I, setting forth the powers of the
legislative branch. 53 Thus, the Senatorial Dominance Model, which
relegates the President to a subordinate role in treatymaking, is incom-
patible with the Treaty Clause's location in Article II.
A comparison of the authority that would be granted to the President
under the Senatorial Dominance Model to his power to execute the law
explains this incompatibility. The Take Care Clause of the Constitution
provides that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. '54 The amount of discretion enjoyed by the President in
executing a law varies. Sometimes, Congress passes a statute which
leaves "a gap for [the Executive] to fill, ' 55 thus delegating to the Execu-
tive the power to "elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regula-
tion., 56 However, Congress also passes very detailed statutes which give
the President much less discretion. The Senatorial Dominance Model
would operate in a similar fashion-the Senate would either give the
President a great deal of flexibility by issuing very broad diplomatic
instructions, or it would limit presidential discretion by issuing detailed
instructions.
But, if the President enjoys only limited discretion in exercising his
Article II power to execute the law, then it should not seem anomalous
for him to enjoy limited discretion in exercising his Article II power to
make treaties. A comparison of the sources of the constraints on these
presidential powers shows that such an anomaly exists. In order for the
President to have any discretion in taking care that a given statute is
enforced, Congress must first pass that statute. And passing statutes is a
power given to Congress in Article I, that section of the Constitution
which describes the powers of the House and Senate. The limited room
for discretion that the President may have when executing a law is not
caused by any provision in Article II. Rather, it results from the interplay
between two grants of power-that assigned to Congress in Article I and
that assigned to the President in Article 11.5' By contrast, with respect to
53. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705.
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
55. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
56. Id. at 844. See also Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192 (1993) ("A lump-sum
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) to distribute the
funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it sees fit.") (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1995).
58. This relationship between an Article I power and the Executive's discretion in
exercising an Article II power is not limited to the context of the Take Care Clause. One other
example concerns the President's role as Commander-in-Chief. In Article II, the Constitution
provides that the "President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
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treaties, the Senate has no Article I power. The textual basis for its role
in treatymaking is derived solely from Article II."
Of course, it is not the case that just because a grant of power to
Congress or to the Senate is located in Article II or Article III, or a grant
of power to the President is located in Article I means that the power is
trivial. An obvious example of this caveat is the veto power, which is
located in Article I, yet gives significant power to the President. 60 Never-
theless, considering how far the Senatorial Dominance Model would tip
the balance of power towards the Senate and the fact that Article I is
silent on the' subject of treatymaking, the Senatorial Dominance Model is
at odds with the Treaty Clause's location in Article II.
D. Reconciling the Treaty Clause with Interpretations of Other
Foreign-Affairs Powers
The Treaty Clause is not only a part of Article II, but is also one of
only a few constitutional provisions that regulate the conduct of foreign
affairs. 6' These few provisions are broadly written and, like the Treaty
Clause, are susceptible to a number of interpretations. 62 Furthermore, the
Constitution is silent on a number of foreign-affairs questions,63 leaving
many of what Professor Henkin refers to as "lacunae.
64
States." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. However, in Article I, the Constitution gives Congress
the power "ft]o declare War," "[t]o raise and support Armies," "[tlo provide and maintain a
Navy," and "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11-14. There is, of course, great disagreement about the relative
scope of congressional and presidential power in this area. See generally HENKIN, supra note
7, at 50-54. At least one thing is certain-a determined Congress that uses its Article I power
to refuse to appropriate funds for a war can sharply limit how the President uses his Article II
Commander-in-Chief power.
59. Although most of the powers granted in Article I are to Congress, Article I, Section
3, Clause 6, does give the Senate the sole power to try impeachments. Thus, the fact that the
President's partner in treatymaking is the Senate, and not Congress, does not justify the Treaty
Clause's presence in Article II or explain the omission of the Senate's treaty-making power
from Article I.
60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. But note that the Senate would enjoy far more treaty-
making power under the Senatorial Dominance Model than the President does with respect to
his veto power. Unlike a refusal by the Senate to authorize a treaty negotiation, a veto can be
overridden. More fundamentally, the veto power is a purely negative power; it does not give
the President any authority to direct Congress to legislate. In this sense, it resembles the
comparatively weak power of the Senate under the Ratification Model. The Senatorial
Dominance Model would give the Senate the much greater power of directing the President to
enter into treaty negotiations.
61. See Louis Henkin, "A More Effective System "for Foreign Relations: The Constitution-
al Framework, in 5 APPENDICES: COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 9 (1975).
62. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1249-50 (1995).
63. For a list of some of these questions, see HENKIN, supra note 7, at 16-17.
64. Henkin, supra note 61, at 10.
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Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions
and filled in these gaps in a manner that has given the President a
significant role in formulating American foreign policy. Although the
Supreme Court has never issued a holding on what "advice" means in the
Treaty Clause, where it has resolved ambiguities in the Constitution's
foreign-affairs provisions, it has not relegated the President to the status
of an agent with the power only to execute a foreign policy set by the
Senate or some other governmental body. Yet, that is precisely what the
Senatorial Dominance Model would accomplish. Although the Supreme
Court has never directly contradicted this Model, its other foreign-affairs
decisions indicate that the Senatorial Dominance Model is an incorrect
interpretation of the Treaty Clause.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Co.,65 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations."6 The origin of the phrase "sole organ" is a 1799 statement by
then-Congressman John Marshall that "[t]he President is the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with
foreign nations. 67 As Professor Corwin has observed, "[c]learly, what
Marshall had foremost in mind was simply the President's role as instru-
ment of communication with other governments."6' Still, since the
Washington Administration, this seemingly narrow power of communica-
tion, in fact, has given the President a broad role in formulating American
foreign policy. As our sole organ of communication:
[t]he President had charge of daily relations with other nations.
Continuous intercourse generated innumerable issues, and someone
had to formulate United States policy about them .... The President
began to make that policy. Small decisions in daily intercourse
inevitably were made "on the spot" by those engaged in the process
.... The President had the facts, and the advice of expert subordi-
nates. He could act quickly, decisively; only he could act when
Congress was not in session and decision was urgent. George
Washington-scrupulous, responsible, non-self-aggrandizing-pro-
claimed neutrality, asked for the recall of the misbehaving French
Minister, fought Indians, launched the Jay Treaty. He, or his cabinet,
65. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
66. Id. at 320.
67. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
68. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 208 (5th
ed. 1984); see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 81 (1990);
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION 52 (1988).
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or his ambassadors, made a myriad of smaller decisions-"formu-
lated national policy"-in conducting relations with countries every
day.69
The significant role the President plays in formulating American foreign
policy does not derive solely from his control over day-to-day interactions
with foreign governments. The Supreme Court's interpretations of the
Constitution's ambiguous foreign-affairs provisions have also added depth
to this role.
One powerful example is the President's possession of the power of
diplomatic recognition. The Constitution provides that the President "shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers." ° As is true of the
Treaty Clause, there is more than one plausible interpretation of this
power to "receive Ambassadors." In Federalist 69, Hamilton downplayed
its importance and described this presidential power as merely symbolic.7'
However, the Washington Administration and all others since have
interpreted this provision as giving the President the unilateral power to
determine which governments the United States recognizes. The Supreme
Court has endorsed this presidential power unequivocally. 72
69. Henkin, supra note 61, at 11. Congress recognized this presidential role in formulating
American foreign policy as early as 1789. When it created the departments of the executive
branch, the First Congress differentiated between foreign and domestic affairs. In domestic
departments, such as the Treasury Department, Congress carefully defined the duties of the
Secretary. By contrast, it authorized the Secretary of State:
[to] perform and execute such duties as shall from time to time be enjoined on or
entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution,
relative to correspondences, commissions or instructions to or with public ministers
or consuls, from the United States, or to negotiations with public ministers from
foreign states or princes, or to memorials or other applications from foreign public
ministers or other foreigners, or to such other matters respecting foreign affairs as
the President ... shall assign to the said department ....
1 Stat. 28 (1789).
70. U.S. CONsT. art. H1, § 3.
71. Hamilton wrote:
The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public
ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of
dignity than authority. It is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the
administration of the government; and it was far more convenient that it should be
arranged in this manner than that there should be a necessity of convening the
legislature, or one of its branches, upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though
it were merely to take the place of a departed predecessor.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 420 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
72. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our
cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to
recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign nations."); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 229 (1942) (The President has "the power to determine the policy which is to govern the
question of recognition.").
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In fact, the President's power is not even limited to unilateral declara-
tions of American recognition but also includes the "modest implied
power" to remove such obstacles to full recognition as "settlement of all
outstanding problems including the claims of our nationals. 73 And the
President has "some measure of power" to remove these obstacles by
"enter[ing] into executive agreements without obtaining the advice and
consent of the Senate., 74 Although this presidential authority to conclude
executive agreements outside of the Treaty Clause is limited in scope,75
and not without its critics,76 its existence is a powerful example of the
way in which the President's Article II foreign-affairs powers have been
broadly construed.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Receipt of Ambassadors
Clause and its endorsement of the President's power to conclude execu-
tive agreements that remove obstacles to recognition are by no means
anomalies.77 The President, in short, has assumed a commanding role in
formulating American foreign policy.7 Gaps and ambiguities in the
original meaning of the Constitution's foreign-affairs provisions have not
been resolved in the manner in which the Senatorial Dominance Model
would interpret the ambiguous Treaty Clause. The President is not a mere
agent in conducting American foreign policy.
73. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30.
74. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682 (1981).
75. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303(4) (1986) ("The
President, on his own authority, may make an international agreement dealing with any matter
that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution.") (emphasis added); Tribe,
supra note 62, at 1267 ("Whatever the details, the impact of an agreement on state or national
sovereignty must ultimately determine whether the agreement" must be in the form of a treaty
rather than an executive agreement.).
76. See Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relation, 71 MICH. L. REV.
1, 33-58 (1972) (arguing that presidential-executive agreements are unconstitutional).
77. For a discussion of the breadth of the President's foreign-affairs powers, see CORWIN,
supra note 68, at 200-56; HENKIN, supra note 7, at 44-65; Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective
Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-56 (1993). The following dicta from
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), provides another example of the broad
way in which the President's foreign-affairs powers have been interpreted:
The President, after all, is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States." U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2. His authority to classify and control access
to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual
is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Executive Branch that will give
that person access to such information flows primarily from this constitutional
investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit
congressional grant.
Id. at 527.
78. See Henkin, supra note 61, at 11-12. Congressman Lee Hamilton, former Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, summarized the President's foreign-affairs powers
succinctly: "We can modify, we can alter. But the fundamental policy remains the president's
policy." MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1994,
at 462 (1993).
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E. Returning to the Text-The Triumph of
the Recommendation Model
Before rejecting the Senatorial Dominance Model, we must confront
one stubborn fact. No matter how many times one cites Curtiss-Wright,
79
describes the breadth of the President's foreign-affairs powers,"0 and
points out that the Treaty Clause is located in Article II, the words "by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" remain in the text of the
Constitution. As Part I.B showed, at the time of the drafting of the
Constitution, "advice and consent" did not just mean ratification. Howev-
er, the Eighteenth Century definition of "advice and consent" is not
sufficient support for the radical departure which the Senatorial Domi-
nance Model would take from the interpretation of the Constitution's
other foreign-affairs provisions. This definition does not overcome the
arguments in favor of a significant presidential role in treatymaking that
were advanced in Parts I.C and I.D.
Even in the Eighteenth Century, the meaning of "advice and consent"
varied depending on the context in which it was used. In Eighteenth
Century England, when Parliament gave the Monarch its "advice and
consent" to a law, Parliament actually wrote the law and the Monarch
fulfilled her limited role by granting her symbolic royal assent. The
parliamentary power to give "advice and consent" was equivalent to the
power to draft and pass legislation." In the American state governments
of the 1780s, the chief executive's power did not consist of rubber-
stamping the Privy Council's votes. Rather, the governor generally shared
power with the Privy Council, together forming a type of plural execu-
tive.8 2 The British Monarch's lawmaking power relative to Parliament was
not identical to the power of American state governors relative to their
Privy Councils. Therefore, despite the usage of "advice and consent" on
both sides of the Atlantic, its meaning depended on its context.
As shown in Parts I.C and I.D the presence of the Treaty Clause in
Article II and its place in a government structured to give the President
79. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See KOH, supra note 68, at 94 ("Among government attorneys,
Justice Sutherland's lavish description of the president's powers is so often quoted that it has
come to be known as the 'Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right' cite.").
80. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 177 (1988) ("[T]he conduct of foreign relations is an aspect of the
executive power entrusted to the President, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions.").
81. See supra text accompanying notes 11-13.
82. See THACH, supra note 16, at 29-34; supra text accompanying notes 14-19. The
exception was New York, which had a strong executive. See THACH, supra note 16, at 34-38.
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a strong role in foreign policymaking gives the Clause a dramatically
different context from that of the Eighteenth Century governments of
England and of the American states. It is so different that the Eighteenth
Century wording of the grant of power to the Senate through the term
"advice and consent" loses relevance. The word choice is not enough to
sustain the radical Senatorial Dominance Model. To conclude otherwise
would amount to what Professors Tribe and Doff call "a dis-integrated
'reading' of the Constitution, ' 3 that is, an attempt "to lift one provision
out, hold it up to the light, and give it its broadest possible interpretation,
while ignoring the fact that it is immersed in a larger whole."'" The
Senatorial Dominance Model suffers from the symptoms of such a dis-
integrated reading.
Having rejected the Senatorial Dominance Model, we are left with
two alternatives. The first alternative, the Ratification Model, gives the
Senate no constitutional role other than to approve treaties that the
President has negotiated. The other possibility is the Recommendation
Model, under which the Senate would have the constitutional power to
give the President advice before and during a treaty negotiation.8 5 The
President would be free to disregard this advice, though he would do so
at some risk, since the Senate could refuse its consent to the completed
treaty.
Choosing between these two models is a much easier task than
disposing of the Senatorial Dominance Model proved to be. The Constitu-
tion contains a number of provisions that give one government entity the
power merely to ratify some action of another. Article I, section 10
contains a list of actions that states may not undertake without "the
Consent of Congress." 6 After two-thirds of the House and Senate propose
83. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1991).
84. Id
85. The Senate has, on rare occasion, chosen to give the President advice before he began
treaty negotiations. One modem example is the Vandenberg Resolution, which the Senate
approved on June 11, 1948. This resolution expressed the sense of the Senate:
that this Government, by Constitutional processes, should particularly pursue...
objectives [including] ... [P]rogressive development of regional and other collective
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the
purposes, principles, and provisions of the [United Nations] Charter [and]...
Association of the United States, by constitutional processes, with such regional and
other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid, and as affect its national security.
S. Res. 239, 80th Cong. (1948) (enacted) (also found in TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS, supra note 7, at 91-92). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 303 reporters' note 3 (1986) (discussing the infrequency with which the Senate has
offered formal treaty-making advice).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2-3 (emphasis added).
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a constitutional amendment, that amendment becomes valid "when
Ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States. '7 The
Constitution took effect after "[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of
nine States."88 Finally, the Constitution defines the President's veto power
in the following manner: "If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it."89 "Advice and consent" is noticeably different from the
terms "consent," "ratified," "ratification," and "approve," which indicates
that the Framers intended to convey a much different power through this
formulation. The Ratification Model would be consistent with these other
constitutional provisions if the Treaty Clause read "by and with the
Consent of the Senate." But that is not what the Treaty Clause says. The
Ratification Model is, therefore, plainly inconsistent with the text of the
Constitution.'
The only interpretation of the Treaty Clause that avoids the pitfalls
that doomed the Senatorial Dominance and Ratification Models is the
Recommendation Model. By giving the Senate the power to offer non-
binding recommendations before and during a treaty negotiation, it neither
relegates the President to the status of an "agent," nor seeks to delete the
words "advice and" from the Constitution. It is the only interpretation that
is faithful to the text and structure of the Constitution.91
87. Id art. V (emphasis added).
88. Id. art. VII (emphasis added).
89. Id. art. I, § 7, ci. 2 (emphasis added).
90. Indeed, the term "ratification" properly refers not to any act of the Senate, but rather
to the President's decision, made after the Senate has consented, to accede to a treaty. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' note 3 (1986).
91. This article takes no position on the meaning of "advice and consent" in the Appoint-
ments Clause. As Senator Henry Cabot Lodge pointed out, the text of the Appointments Clause
may suggest that the Constitution gives the Senate less of a role in appointments than it does
in treaties:
[T]he carefully phrased section gives the President absolute and unrestricted right to
nominate, and the Senate can only advise and consent to the appointment of, a given
person. All right to interfere in the remotest degree with the power of nomination
and the consequent power of selection is wholly taken from the Senate. Very
different is the wording of the treaty clause. There the words "by and with the advice
and consent of" come in after the words "shall have power" and before the power
referred to is defined. The "advice and consent of the Senate" are therefore coexten-
sive with the "power" conferred on the President, which is "to make treaties," and
apply to the entire process of treaty-making.
LODGE, supra note 2, at 231-32. But see David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1495 (1992) ("These words
assign two distinct roles to the Senate-an advisory function before the nomination has
occurred and a reviewing function after the fact .... The clause thus envisions a genuinely
consultative relationship between the Senate and the President.").
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F. Defining the Breadth of the Senate's Advice
Power under the Recommendation Model
Choosing the Recommendation Model does not end our inquiry into
the meaning of "advice." Though the Senate has the constitutional power
to offer its opinion, the nature of the subjects on which it may exercise
this power is nebulous. The Treaty Clause may broadly empower the
Senate to give advice on any matter related to the making of a treaty,
including details such as the day-to-day strategy the executive should
employ when negotiating with a foreign country. Conversely, it may grant
a more narrow advice power limited to offering recommendations on the
broad policy goals to be pursued in a treaty negotiation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Curtiss-Wright helps to resolve this
issue. The Court explained that as our sole organ of communication with
foreign governments, the President "alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude . . .92
Curtiss-Wright's exclusion of the Senate from the day-to-day conduct
of treaty negotiations is consistent with John Jay's position in Federalist
64. Recall that John Jay warned that "tilt seldom happens in the
negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and
immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. '"' Jay argued that secrecy
and dispatch were presidential attributes. He further noted that the
President need not consult with the Senate in all circumstances but only
in circumstances where the President required the Senate's "advice and
consent. ,
94
History also supports the idea that the Senate's advice power does not
cover day-to-day negotiating strategy. At the time of the framing and
92. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
93. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 45, at 392. Then-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jay
expressed similar sentiments to the Articles of Confederation Congress in 1785:
It is proper and common to instruct Ministers on the great Points to be agitated, and
to inform them how far they are to insist on some, and how far they may yield on
others. But I am inclined to think it is very seldom thought necessary to leave
nothing at all to their Discretion; for where that ought to be the Case, the Man ought
not to be employed .... Should [a Spanish envoy) discover (and discover it he will)
that every thing he may say to me, which may be denominated a Proposition, is to
be reduced to Writing and laid before Congress, I think it probable that he would
observe more Caution and Reserve, than he might otherwise deem necessary and it
does not strike me as expedient thus to urge him to be circumspect.
29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 88-89 (Library of Congress ed. 1906) quoted
in Bestor, supra note 8, at 61.
94. See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 45, at 393.
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ratification of the Constitution, transatlantic travel and communications
were so slow and inefficient that it would have been physically impossi-
ble for the Senate to give advice on the daily conduct of treaty negotia-
tions. Indeed, even the Articles of Confederation, Congress insisted on
controlling only basic policy decisions and gave its Secretary of Foreign
Affairs control over the day-to-day conduct of treaty negotiations.95
Thus, although the Senate has the power to offer nonbinding policy
recommendations regarding the goals of a treaty negotiation, it has no
constitutional power to offer advice on the day-to-day conduct of a treaty
negotiation. The President and his foreign-policy apparatus enjoy plenary
power over day-to-day matters such as when to make concessions, when
to tell the truth, when to bluff, and when to lie.
However, the Senatorial power to offer nonbinding policy advice may
prove insignificant. Suppose, for example, that the Senate offered the
President its opinion regarding what negotiating strategy the President
should employ in a treaty negotiation. Constitutionally, such advice would
be beyond the Senate's Treaty Clause power, but no one could prevent
the Senate from doing so.
The power to grant nonbinding advice implies the conveyance of
other Senatorial powers. In order for the Senate to perform its advice
function, it must have access to foreign-policy information which is
compiled by the executive and which is often top secret. As Part II
explains, the Senate's possession of a constitutional power to give
nonbinding advice provides it with a constitutional sword to obtain the
required information from the Executive.
PART II: USING THE "ADVICE" FUNCTION AS A SWORD:
THE SENATE'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE
INFORMATION FROM THE EXECUTIVE
A. Giving Knowledgeable Advice-The Need for Information
If the Senate chooses to exercise its right under the Recommendation
Model to give nonbinding advice to the President, it runs into an im-
mense practical obstacle-its lack of access to foreign-policy information.
As Part I.D discussed, the President is our sole organ of communication
with foreign governments. He controls a huge foreign-policy apparatus
95. See Bestor, supra note 8, at 60-62 (discussing Congress's decision to approve
Secretary Jay's suggestion that he not be required to share with Congress every proposal that
he would receive or make in his 1785-86 treaty negotiation with Spain).
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that receives and analyzes information from abroad. By contrast, the
Senate has a limited foreign-policy staff and does not have any routine
contact with representatives of foreign states.
This asymmetry gives the President the opportunity to deny the
Senate the ability to give advice before or during a treaty negotiation.
Because the President controls the foreign-policy apparatus, he could
order his diplomats to commence negotiations on a treaty and not inform
the Senate of the negotiations until the treaty is signed. The Senate, of
course, could defend itself by refusing to give its consent to a secretly
negotiated treaty.96 But that is easier said than done. By the time that the
President has signed a treaty, negotiating positions have crystallized and
international commitments have been made.9 If the Senate were to refuse
to consent to the treaty, it would risk possible loss of American credibili-
ty abroad. 9
Presidential administrations are, of course, aware that informing the
Senate of a treaty only after it has been signed can short-circuit the
Senate's advice function. At times, the Executive has expressed a desire
not to undermine the Senate's advice power. For instance, Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles explained to the Senate:
It will be our effort to see that the Senate gets its opportunity to
"advise and consent" in time so that it does not have to choose
between adopting treaties it does not like or embarrassing our
international position by rejecting what has already been negotiated
out with foreign governments.99
Unfortunately, Secretary Dulles's high-sounding words are the exception,
not the rule. Presidential administrations have often not given the Senate
adequate information on treaty negotiations and have left the Senate with
the dilemma described by Secretary Dulles."°
96. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-16, at 286 (2d ed.
1988).
97. See Henkin, supra note 61, at 15-16.
98. See id.
99. The Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 28 DEP'T ST. BULL. 592 (1953).
100. See Henkin, supra note 61, at 15-16. Although he does not directly address the
Senate's right to information regarding treaty negotiations, George Kennan, a leading American
diplomat during the Cold War, expresses the distaste that some in the executive have for
sharing foreign-policy information:
I pointed out [to a Washington reporter] that personally[,] I had entered a profession
which I thought had to do with the representation of United States interests vis-a-vis
foreign governments; that this was what I had been trained for and what I was
prepared to do to the best of my ability; and that I had never understood that part
of my profession was to represent the US government vis-a-vis the Congress; that
my specialty was the defense of US interests against others, not against our own
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The doctrine of executive privilege gives the President the constitu-
tionally based right to withhold certain types of information from Con-
gress or the courts. But, the doctrine may not give the President license
to undermine the Senate's advice function by withholding information
about an ongoing or future treaty negotiation. 10
B. Executive Privilege-General Principles
The first assertion of executive privilege to withhold treaty-making
information occurred during the Washington Administration. In 1796, the
House of Representatives requested that President Washington provide it
with papers relating to the negotiation of the Jay Treaty." Washington
refused the request and, in a statement to the House quoted approvingly
by the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright, Washington explained his
decision:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution and their success
must often depend on secrecy; and even when brought to a
conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or
eventual concessions which may have been proposed or
contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a
pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate
inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other
powers. 103
Washington based his denial of the House's request partly on the fact that
the Constitution vested treaty-making power in the President and the
Senate, but excluded the House1°4 He concluded that the House should
have no "right... to demand ... all the papers respecting a negotiation
with a foreign power."'0 5
representatives; that I resented the State Department being put in the position of
lobbyists before Congress in favor of the US people; ... that we were not their
keepers or their mentors; that it was up to them to inform themselves just as it is up
to us to inform ourselves; that 98 percent of the information needed as background
for judgments on questions of foreign policy can be found in the New York Times
and that I had no sympathy with the allegations that Congress cannot act intelligently
in these questions because "it has not been given the facts."
GEORGE F. KENNAN, MEMOIRS 1925-50, at 405 (1967).
101. For a brief discussion of the President's power to withhold treaty-making information
from the Senate, see TRIBE, supra note 96, § 4-16, at 285-86.
102. See CORWIN, supra note 68, at 212.
103. 299 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1936).
104. I11 at 321.
105. lit For a discussion of this confrontation between President Washington and the
House of Representatives, see BERGER, supra note 12, at 132.
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Unlike the House, the Senate does have a share in the treaty-making
power. So Washington's refusal to honor the House's request is of limited
applicability to presidential denials of Senate information requests. 106 But
Washington did have a point. Diplomatic negotiations demand secrecy.
A President who turns down a Senate request for information might do
so not out of some malevolent desire to undermine the Senate's ability to
perform its advice function, but out of a fear that the Senate would leak
confidential information and thus harm America's position in a treaty
negotiation. Unfortunately, legal precedents do not clearly indicate
whether the President may rely on executive privilege to withhold treaty-
making information from the Senate for reasons of secrecy
In United States v. Nixon, 107 the Supreme Court's leading decision
on executive privilege, the Court held that, under certain circumstances,
the President has a constitutional privilege to refuse to disclose informa-
tion to a criminal court. The privilege is based on "the supremacy of each
branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties" ' and on
"the valid need for protection of communications between high Govern-
ment officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance
of their manifold duties. ' ' 1°9 However, the Court found that "[a] Presi-
dent's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of
his office is general in nature"'' 0 and was outweighed by the "constitu-
tional need for production of relevant evidence" in a specific criminal
proceeding. '
In dicta, the Court did acknowledge the importance of secrecy in
foreign affairs." 2 But the Court stressed that its holding applied only to
106. In fact, Washington did turn over his administration's Jay Treaty papers to the Senate.
See Abraham D. Sofaer, Executive Power and the Control of Information: Practice Under the
Framers, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1, 7-12.
107. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. ld at 705.
109. id
110. Id. at 712-13.
111. Id. at 713.
112. The Court used strong language:
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that
there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this
is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should notjeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an
examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers.
Id at 711 (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). But see TRIBE, supra
note 96, § 4-15, at 284-85 (arguing that this dicta should not be read as prohibiting in camera
inspections of material when there is no extrinsic evidence that the material contains state
secrets).
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"the conflict between the President's assertion of a generalized privilege
of confidentiality and the constitutional need for relevant evidence in
criminal trials" and not to "congressional demands for information"I1 " (or
Senate requests for treaty-making information). The Supreme Court has
never ruled on an executive-privilege dispute between the President and
the House or Senate.
114
In United States v..American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 5 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did consider an
executive-privilege controversy between the Executive and Congress.
AT&T involved an effort by a House Subcommittee to obtain from the
Justice Department, AT&T records pertaining to certain warrantless
wiretaps. The Justice Department refused to turn over the records, citing
national security concerns. The court reasoned that if it were to decide the
case on the merits, it would have to employ a Nixon-like balancing test:
[W]e would be called on to balance the constitutional interests
raised by the parties, including such factors as the strength of
Congress's need for the information in the request letters, the
likelihood of a leak of the information in the Subcommittee's hands,
and the seriousness of the harm to national security from such a
release. "6
It declined to apply the balancing test, declaring that "[a] court seeking
to balance the legislative and executive interests asserted here would face
severe problems in formulating and applying standards."' 1 7 These prob-
lems would be particularly great when it came to estimating the danger
to national security." s Accordingly, the court ordered the Department of
Justice and the Subcommittee to return to the bargaining table and try to
reach a settlement.
113. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712 n.19.
114. See Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws:
The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 471 (1987).
115. 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
116. 1d at 391.
117. Id at 394.
118. Id The court also found that making such an estimate would prove to be difficult and
unbecoming:
As to the danger to national security, a court would have to consider the Subcommit-
tee's track record for security [and] the likelihood of a leak if other members of the
House sought access to the material. In addition to this delicate and possibly
unseemly determination, the court would have to weight the effect of a leak on
intelligence activities and diplomatic relations. Finally, the court would have to
consider the reasonableness of the alternatives offered by the parties and decide
which would better reconcile the competing constitutional interests.
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A year later, the parties were still unable to reach an agreement, and
they returned to the court of appeals." 9 Using strong language, the court
rejected the Executive's claim that "the Constitution confers on the
executive absolute discretion in the area of national security."' 20 But,
discouraged by the difficulty of balancing the Subcommittee's need for
the information with the Executive's national security claim, the court
flinched. It noted that "the Constitution is largely silent on the question
of [the] allocation of powers associated with foreign affairs and national
security. These powers [fall]... within a 'zone of twilight' in which the
President and Congress share authority or in which its distribution is
uncertain.. 2 ' The court found that the dispute between the House Sub-
committee and the Department of Justice fell within this "zone of twi-
light."' 22 It declined to rule in favor of either party and instead devised
a detailed plan that the court hoped would break the impasse.12 1
The court of appeals's performance in AT&T seems to show that
resolving an executive-privilege dispute over treaty-making information
would be an extremely difficult task. Applying a Nixon-like balancing
approach, as in AT&T, would raise problems similar to those that so
confounded the court of appeals. For instance, when considering the
possible threat to national security, the courts would have to devise a
means of determining the likelihood that the Senate would leak the
information. Furthermore, they would have to estimate whether these
leaks would damage the President's capacity to negotiate.
In AT&T, the court of appeals found issues like these difficult to
decide because the Constitution is silent on whether a House Subcommit-
tee can be trusted to keep national-security secrets. 24 Without much
constitutional context, these issues would have required a seat-of-the-
pants judgment from the court of appeals. Fortunately, when it comes to
119. United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 567 F2d 121 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
120. Id. at 128.
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id at 131-33. For a criticism of the court's solution, see Bruce E. Fein, Access to
Classified Information: Constitutional and Statutory Dimension, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805,
840 (1985) (characterizing AT&T as "wooly and temporizing").
124. The Constitution's requirement that "[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its
Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy[,]" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (emphasis added), would provide
some textual evidence refuting a blanket assertion by the President that he can always withhold
information from Congress on the grounds that Congress can never be trusted not to disclose
any secret information. However, this constitutional provision is too general to be of much use
in assessing the more nuanced argument that the court faced in AT&T--that under the
circumstances of the case, a congressional subcommittee could not be trusted with certain
specific information that would be particularly harmful to national security. United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 551 F.2d 384, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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disputes over information relevant to treatymaking, the fact that the
Constitution grants the Senate the power to offer advice answers the
question of when the Senate is to be trusted with sensitive information.
C. The Link Between the Breadth of the Senate's Advice Power
and its Right to Information
To see what impact the Senate's advice power has on its right to
demand information, we shall discuss two different types of information
requests-one for information not linked to the Senate's advice power
and the other for information needed by the Senate to exercise its advice
power.
Let us begin with the following information request: "Please describe
the negotiating strategy the administration plans to use in next week's
negotiations with the Russians." Recall that, as Part I.F explained, al-
though the Senate has the constitutional power to offer nonbinding policy
recommendations regarding the goals of a treaty negotiation, it has no
power to offer advice on the day-to-day strategy and conduct of a treaty
negotiation. The Senate would, therefore, have a very weak claim to this
information. In fact, it would have a weaker claim than the House
Subcommittee had on the wiretap records that were the subject of AT&T.
In AT&T, the Subcommittee was "inquiring into a suitable area of federal
legislation-interception of interstate telephone communication." '25 By
contrast, it is hard to see any tangible connection between the Senate's
information request and a suitable area of federal 'legislation or to any
Senate power.1
26
As for the President's interest in withholding information, recall that,
as Jay explained, one of the reasons that the Executive was given the sole
125. 551 F.2d, at 393. See also Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S.
491, 504 n.15 (1975) ("The subject of any inquiry always must be one 'on which legislation
could be had.' " (quoting McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927))); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (Congress's investigative power "encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed
statutes.... It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste.").
126. One could concoct an attenuated link to Congress's appropriations power. Congress
does have an interest in seeing that the diplomatic corps, for which it appropriates money,
operates effectively. But this link is very tenuous when compared to the President's need for
secrecy.
If the Senatorial Dominance Model applied, then there would be a strong connection
between the Senate's information request and a Senate power. Under the Senatorial Dominance
Model, the Senate would have the power to decide upon the policy to be pursued in a treaty
negotiation. The Senate's information request would then be linked to an oversight interest in
ensuring that its negotiating instructions were being followed by the treaty negotiators.
However, under the Recommendation Model, the Senate has no authority to see that its advice
is followed and that link does not exist.
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power over the day-to-day conduct of treaty negotiations was that it alone
was thought capable of maintaining the "perfect secrecy [that is] some-
times requisite."'27 The President, therefore, would have a firm constitu-
tional basis for asserting that he needed to withhold the information to
preserve secrecy. When we balance the constitutional interests of the
President and Senate, as called for by Nixon and AT&T, it becomes clear
that a Senate request for information on the day-to-day conduct of a
treaty negotiation would not withstand a claim of executive privilege.
Now consider a very different request: "Before next week's arms-
control negotiations begin, please send to the Senate a description of how
dismantling one hundred long-range missiles would affect our nuclear
deterrent." In order for the Senate to exercise its constitutional power to
give intelligent advice on how many missiles we should agree to disman-
tle, it would need this information. In assigning to the Senate the power
to offer nonbinding advice on the policy goals to be pursued in a treaty
negotiation, the Framers implicitly made a decision about the Senate's
ability to keep secrets. The Framers were well aware that secrecy is
crucial to the success of a treaty negotiation. Indeed, as Hamilton ex-
plained in Federalist 75, one of the principal reasons why the House of
Representatives-but not the Senate-was excluded from treatymaking
was out of a fear that the House would leak diplomatic information. 28
Despite the acknowledgment by Hamilton, Jay, and others of this need
for secrecy, the Constitution empowers the Senate to play an active role
in treatymaking. It excludes the Senate only from the day-to-day conduct
of treaty negotiations and declines to confine the Senate's role to that of
a post-negotiation ratifier. Any presidential attempt to withhold informa-
tion that the Senate needs to perform its advice function would, therefore,
amount to an assertion that the Framers misjudged the Senate's compe-
tence to preserve diplomatic secrets. Whether or not the Framers were
right is, perhaps, debatable. 29 What is not debatable is that, absent a
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, supra note 45, at 392. See supra text accompanying notes
45-46.
128. See THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 48, at 452 (indicating that the House could
not "share in the formation of treaties" because, among other things, "decision, secrecy and
dispatch are incompatible with the genius of a body so variable and numerous").
129. It is by no means clear that the Senate would leak sensitive diplomatic information.
Indeed, there are many measures that the Senate may take to minimize the risk of disclosure:
Hearings involving classified information can be held in closed executive sessions;
classified documents can be made available for examination by members of Congress
or their staffs only in executive branch offices; disclosure of classified documents
can be made only to select committees or select members; classified documents can
be held in secure rooms and safes in congressional offices for perusal there without
notetaking; debates on the floor of the House or Senate concerning national security
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constitutional amendment, we are not free to second guess the Framers'
judgment and to strip the Senate of power granted to it by the Constitu-
tion.
When we place these principles on the Nixon and AT&T balancing
scale, we find that the Senate's constitutional interest in the information
is strong while, in light of the power granted to the Senate by the Treaty
Clause, the President has no legitimate interest in keeping the information
from the Senate. Thus, although the President has the authority to deny
Senate requests for information regarding the day-to-day conduct of treaty
negotiations, he must turn over information needed by the Senate to
exercise its constitutional power to give advice on the policy goals to be
pursued in a treaty negotiation.
D. The Line-Drawing Problem
In practice, distinguishing between the day-to-day conduct of a treaty
negotiation and the policy goals to be pursued in a negotiation may not
always be easy. A Senate demand to know whether the administration
will bluff next Thursday clearly falls on one side of the line, and an
inquiry regarding how many missiles the United States could agree to
dismantle while maintaining nuclear superiority would clearly fall on the
other. But negotiating tactics and policy objectives sometimes cannot be
separated so easily. For instance, consider the following Senate informa-
tion request: "Will we walk out of the negotiations on May 5?" A
decision to suspend negotiations can be seen as a mere tactical move
calculated to pressure the other party to make concessions. But, if one of
the paramount negotiating goals was to sign a treaty at all costs by May
6, suspending talks on May 5 could be considered a substantive decision.
The analysis advanced in this article does, however, provide some
much needed structure to the AT&T balancing test. Recall that the AT&T
court faced the "delicate and possibly unseemly" task of weighing the
Subcommittee's need for information against the Subcommittee's propen-
sity to leak and the President's need for secrecy. 3 ' Deciding an execu-
tive-privilege dispute over treaty-making information involves the far
more concrete task of drawing a line between information related to the
information can be held in secret; or classified information may be transmitted to
congressional committees only with pledges of secrecy.
Fein, supra note 123, at 816. Since the Senate would be politically accountable for leaks, it
would have an incentive to take these or other measures to ensure that secret information is not
disclosed.
130. 551 F.2d at 394.
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day-to-day conduct of negotiations and information related to policy
goals. This task is not only more manageable, but would also spare a
court from having to make a delicate judgment about whether the Senate
can be trusted to keep secrets.
CONCLUSION
In Wilson v. Girard, the Supreme Court was, in a sense, right.
Nowadays, the Senate plays no part in treatymaking other than to consid-
er agreements that the President has already signed. It does, to paraphrase
the Court, "ratify" treaties."' But, the Constitution gives the Senate the
power not just to consent to treaties, but also to offer the President
"advice." Although the Treaty Clause does not empower the Senate to set
the policy to be pursued in treaty negotiations, it does give the Senate the
constitutional authority to demand diplomatic information from the
Executive and to offer policy recommendations that would help to shape
our nation's treaties.
Were the Senate to use its advice power aggressively, the Executive
would surely claim that the Senate's meddling would be harmful and that
the Senate cannot be trusted with sensitive diplomatic information.
Whether the Executive's arguments are correct as a policy matter is
difficult to say. But, in giving the Senate the power to offer advice, the
Constitution has rejected these arguments, and the Senate has just as
much constitutional authority to use its advice power as the President
does to use his power to negotiate treaties.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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